The reasons why I choose “Corporate Governance in China: an Overview” article:
This paper shows about corporate governance (gongsi zhili) is a concept whose time seems definitely to have come in China.
COMPONENT OF COMPARISONS | ARTICLE 1
COURSE READING PACKAGE (CRP) |
ARTICLE 2 |
TITLE | Identification of Role of Social Audit by Stakeholders as Accountability Tool in Good Governance
S.S. Ghonkrokta and Anu Singh Lather |
corporate governance in China: an Overview
Donald C. Clarke |
TOPIC | Corporate Governance
Social audit is being viewed as a promising approach to improve the performance and social accountability in private as well as in public sector. |
Corporate Governance
The major theme of this article is that the state wants to make SOEs operate more efficiently by subjecting them to a new and different set of rules, the rules of organization under the “Modern enterprise system”. |
THEORY USED BY ARTICLE RESEARCH | Social audit
Good governance Accountability (Asian Development Bank-2000 and scientific) |
Corporate governance
Chinese CGLI reform Company Law Corporatization |
HYPOTHESIS OF RESEARCH | Social audit creates confidence in society regarding government initiatives, promotes transparency and efficiency, improves social, ethical and environmental performance, enhance inclusion, facilitates monitoring and ensures accountability. | Chinese corporate governance in this narrow sense, and attempts to explain some perplexing features of its discourse, laws, and institutions. |
VARIABLE USED | This research uses questionnaire that list about 30 positive statements identifying the likely role of social audit is prepared and placed in a 5 point Likert scale. To check the face and construct validity, questionnaire is given for examination and examined by 6 experts. To check the test and retest reliability, questionnaire was given to a set of 30 stakeholders taken from 5 categories of stakeholders | State-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly after their transformation into one of the corporate forms provided for under the Company Law, and listed companies, which must be companies limited by shares (CLS) under the Company Law. |
METHOD OF ANALYSIS | This research uses questionnaire that list about 30 positive statements identifying the likely role of social audit is prepared and placed in a 5 point Likert scale. The most positive answer is rated at 5 point and the most negative at 1 point. To check the face and construct validity, questionnaire is given for examination and examined by 6 experts. These experts were selected from different stakeholders, 1 citizen, 1 legal, 1 politician, 2 officials, and 1 educationist so as to include specialists from different categories, professions, and fields. To check the test and retest reliability, questionnaire was given to a set of 30 stakeholders taken from 5 categories of stakeholders (citizen, legal professionals, political persons, bureaucracy/officials and media). Retest was done after 15 days interval. Results were compiled and Pearson’s correlation coefficient calculated along with other statistical analysis done by using SPSS software. | Chinese corporate governance discourse in practice focuses almost exclusively on agency
problems, and within only two types of firms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly after their transformation into one of the corporate forms provided for under the Company Law, and listed companies, which must be companies limited by shares (CLS) under the Company Law. |
RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS RESEACRH | High reliability and validity of the instrument developed on positive statement establishes the appropriateness of the tool designed for assessing the role of social audit and its likely benefits and utility to stakeholders. Reliability and validity go side by side.
The benefits of role areas:
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Any discussion of corporate governance in China must take seriously the implications of the state’s policy of continuing and significant involvement in enterprise ownership. Many of the problems the drafters of the Company Law sought to address are not necessarily best addressed by a statute like the Company Law, or even by an institution such as legislation and government enforcement. |